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Key insights into such questions can be developed 
using the framework of coordination games.  
Coordination problems are situations where  agents 
want to do what other agents are doing, but they 
have no way to agree on the common course of 
action.  They can be modelled using Game Theory. 
Interactions among several agents are referred to 
as a game. It becomes a coordination game when 
multiple stable outcomes — or equilibria — exist 
and, in principle, the agents could coordinate equally 
well on any of them. For example, depositors play 
a coordination game when deciding whether or not 
to withdraw their money from a bank. So do traders 
when they each decide individually whether or not to 
short a currency.
The challenge for a policy maker facing an economic 
crisis is to identify the agents in the game with 
the most influence on the process of recovery, 
who should be the key recipients of the bulk of 
the available funds. A poor choice could result 
in a coordination failure — an equilibrium that’s 
individually rational but damaging overall, such as a 
bank run, or no one investing in a profitable common 
project, like standardisation.
Until recently, little guidance has been available on 
how to choose the most appropriate agents since 
we have lacked a good method for studying this 
question. Sákovics and Steiner have found a simple 
technical way of doing it precisely.
Imagine a policy maker trying to engineer an 
economic recovery from a crisis. Since his funds are 
limited, he must decide how best to allocate them to 
generate the highest likelihood of recovery. To decide 
he needs to answer several questions. For example, 
should he subsidize corporations rather than workers 
or vice versa? Should one type of industry receive 
more funds than others? Should the policy maker put 
greater focus on encouraging new investment than on 
supporting existing investments? 
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This model is based on two 
key concepts: 
aThe risk dominance criterion
aThe belief constraint
As is often the case with cutting edge research, 
Sákovics and Steiner’s approach came about 
serendipitously. “We were playing around with a 
set of models without anything practical in mind,” 
they recall, “when we hit upon a novel and powerful 
solution method”.  Two key concepts underlie their 
model. The risk dominance criterion, which is an 
old and important concept, showing that in times of 
uncertainty, mutual worries can become self-fulfilling. 
For example, when faced with the risk of a bank run 
all agents might coordinate on withdrawing their 
money from an otherwise solvent bank, thereby 
damaging the bank’s chances of surviving the run. 
The other concept — the belief constraint — is their 
own discovery. It recognizes that when you ask the 
pivotal agents (who are indifferent between the two 
actions) of groups of people with differing incentives 
about how optimistic they are the sum of optimism 
across the groups stays constant, no matter how 
the incentives have changed. This ‘Law of Belief 
Conservation’ has proven to be extremely useful in 
deriving the optimal policy.
Their model provides guidance in situations well 
beyond mall rentals. Financial regulation is one such 
arena. Take, for example, a country in such financial 
distress that it has frozen all bank deposits but then 
decides to allow some depositors to withdraw their 
money to maintain liquidity. “Our model allows us to 
track how a discriminatory withdrawal policy affects 
the probability of a run, thus informing the policy 
discussion,” they write.
Similarly, the model can play a role in a corporation’s 
introduction of new technology, such as 
videoconferencing. Typically, organizations seed a 
group of employees to adopt the technology first, in 
hopes that they will highlight any technical problems 
and help to convince co-workers to accept the 
technology. “Our model can easily be adapted to find 
the optimal seeding policy,” the pair writes. And, in 
the example of economic crisis recovery, the model 
gives guidance on whom to subsidize to stimulate the 
economy.
 “In the canonical case of investment subsidization 
we find that ideal candidates for the subsidy need 
to satisfy only two criteria: (i) their investment has 
a relatively large direct impact on the incentives of 
others, but (ii) they are relatively insensitive to the 
investment of others.” More pithily put, you subsidise 
the agents with high spillover to the incentives of 
other agents but who don’t care too much about the 
activity of the others.
The first criterion is fairly obvious. The second is much 
less so. Why should one rely on largely independent 
agents to lead a team effort to avoid disaster? The 
authors explain 
“If you subsidise the insensitive agents, it 
follows that those who are not subsidised 
are relatively sensitive. So they’ll be more 
stimulated by the increased economic activity 
of the subsidized agents, maximising the 
indirect effect of the subsidies.”
To illustrate their result, Steiner and Sákovics cite 
the way in which shopping mall developers set their 
rental fees. Typically the department stores that 
anchor a mall receive large discounts on their rents. 
“Anchor shops bring in loyal customers who end up 
shopping at other stores as well; thus their decisions 
have a large impact on the decisions of others,” they 
write. “At the same time their sales are relatively 
unaffected by the custom of shoppers derived from 
other stores — as shown by the similarity of their 
sales per square feet between regional and super-
regional malls.”
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